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Projects: Space AdvocacyCongressional Testimony of Shuttle Astronaut Kathryn ThorntonKathryn C. Thornton., Ph.D. before the Committee on Science and Technology
Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Feeney, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. My name is Kathryn Thornton and I am a Professor and Associate Dean in the School of Engineering and Applied Science at the University of Virginia. I appear here this morning in my role as an organizer and co-chair of an independent workshop entitled Examining the Vision: Balancing Exploration and Science held last February at Stanford University. The workshop was co-hosted by Stanford University Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and The Planetary Society. Other organizers were co-chair Professor G. Scott Hubbard from Stanford University, Dr. Louis Friedman of The Planetary Society; and Dr. Wesley T. Huntress, Jr., of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The post-workshop joint communiqué and a partial list of participants are attached. The intent of the workshop was to critically examine the current implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration as announced by President Bush in January 2004, especially to help prepare for a new Administration’s consideration of its broad space program goals and plans. Whatever results from the 2008 elections, there will very likely be new political considerations directing the U.S. space program. Almost certainly there will be bi-partisan support for new investment in NASA’s Earth Science missions. In addition there may well be a review of the “balance” between spending for space science and human exploration. The Vision for Space Exploration in its original plan was a major redirection of the human space flight program with an accompanying emphasis on scientific exploration. Whatever changes might be made in its implementation in the next administration, we wanted to identify, highlight and support the best parts of the current concept. Our goal was to create a report intended to be useful in the next stage of policy planning, and potentially to define follow-on studies of the issues. The Vision for Space Exploration provided specific targets, defined human and robotic exploration objectives and set timetables. The Vision as originally put forth was rich in scientific goals aimed at finding life elsewhere in the Universe. In addition, the Vision continually pointed toward Mars as the ultimate target for human exploration and couched the exploration of the moon in those terms. Four years later, implementation of the Vision has focused on a small subset of the original concept: finishing the International Space Station (ISS) for international partners, retiring the shuttle by 2010 and developing new launch vehicles (Ares I and V) and a new crew vehicle (Orion), and the moon as the near term goal of human exploration. With the fixed requirements, fixed schedule and NASA’s flat budget, funding to meet the Vision has come from science, aeronautics and technology. Aeronautics has been reduced radically, life sciences have been largely eliminated, the entire crosscutting technology budget has been redirected, and $4B over 5 years was taken from the space and Earth science budget. Much of the originally planned funding for the human exploration mandates has not materialized, while the cost of returning the Space Shuttle to flight and its impeding retirement has risen. With these concerns as the motivation, the workshop was planned as a two-day, behind-closed-doors discussion of the goals and implementation of the Presidential directive, and the issue of balance between exploration and science. Organizers sought to bring together scientists, astronauts, engineers, policy analysts, and industry executives in a single conversation where insights across traditional boundaries could occur. The discussions were organized around the following topics:
Invitations were extended to individuals whom the organizers felt would bring great diversity of thought, as well as expertise, on those topics. Each participant was invited to take off his or her corporate, institutional or advocate hat, and engage in discussion that will help this nation have the best possible space exploration program. To the extent that the outcome might be critical of the current plans, progress or goals, criticism was intended to be constructive and consistent with strong support for space exploration. As expected, lively discussions ensued. Pre-workshop reporting predicted that the outcome of the workshop would be a repudiation of at least some of major the goals of the Vision. There was some doubt that fifty Type-A personalities, selected specifically for their wide ranging and divergent views, could reach a consensus on the goals and directions for America’s space exploration program over the course of a two day workshop. Therefore there was no predetermined workshop report or product, but rather the expectation that these discussion would lead to further study and output in some form. Nevertheless, workshop participants did reach consensus on the following statements which in essence endorse the Vision as announced in 2004.
These statements represent consensus among all workshop participants. I would like to expand on them from my own perspective. It is time for humans to go beyond low Earth orbit. The post-Apollo space program exchanged exploration for utilization; exploration on the moon for the prospect of a permanent laboratory, factory, and satellite repair station orbiting within a few hundred miles of the Earth’s surface. The quest for a permanent presence and routine access to space resulted in the Space Shuttle, one of the most remarkable machines ever built, and now the ISS. Just as the Space Shuttle today bears only a slight resemblance to early concepts for a fully reusable spacecraft, the ISS we have now is not the ISS that was promised more than two decades ago. Nevertheless it must be completed in order to fulfill obligations to our international partners before we can move on. The Space Shuttle and ISS firmly anchor humans in low-earth orbit, and orbiting the Earth, as thrilling as it is, is not exploring space Mars and beyond is the goal of human exploration. Although “Mars and beyond” as the goal of human exploration is a consensus of workshop participants, the question of intermediate steps was debated at length without overall agreement. A steppingstone approach to Mars might include some or all of the following intermediate steps: sorties to the moon and the Sun-Earth Lagrange points (L2) as the first step out of LEO; longer missions of perhaps a year’s duration to a near Earth asteroid as the first step out of the Earth’s gravity well; and expeditions to the Martian moons, Phobos and Deimos, which would be of similar duration to Mars missions but without the need for complex and risky landing and launch systems. The important point is that each of the steppingstones, whichever they may be, should advance the science and technology needed for the next, more ambitious objective and for the eventual human exploration of Mars, and none should be considered as permanent outposts that would again anchor us in place for decades. Exploration should be goal driven, not schedule driven. The exploration goal has been repeatedly found to be the basis of public excitement and interest in the space program. In the aftermath of the tragic loss of Columbia and her crew, this was forcefully reasserted in the discussions of why the value of human space flight is worth the cost and the risk. Indeed it was in that aftermath that the Vision for Space Exploration was born. Exploration is open-ended, it has no limits. But it has interim objectives and those also should be publicly engaging and seen as milestones on a longer road. Practical engineering for meeting milestones is bound by three major constraints: budget, schedule and requirements. If you change one of these three, the other two must change accordingly. Particularly if the budget is overconstrained, either schedule or requirements must give – and that is what is happening today. The gaps years, years in which there will be no US human space launch capability stretch to or beyond the middle of the next decade, while human missions to the moon by the year 2020, as specified in the Vision, are exceedingly unlikely. I strongly believe the goals of the Vision are valid, but recognize that budget difficulties will remain. It is important to remain focused on the goals, not the schedule, and proceed as efficiently and safely as technology and budget will allow. Science is enabled by human exploration, but is not the goal of exploration. To be sure, there are compelling science objectives at each of the intermediate destinations en route to Mars, and important scientific questions that must be answered before humans can venture beyond LEO. But the motivations for science and human exploration are different, even as they are synergistic. Science seeks to answer questions of the origin of the universe and of ourselves, and the processes that govern nature. Motivation for human exploration is largely derived from innate human characteristics such as curiosity, imagination and the desire not just to understand but to experience, the drive to compete and more recently the need to cooperate. Geopolitical influences shape our exploration goals as much now as they did in the 1960s. One of the questions posed in the workshop was, “When is a human the tool of choice for solar system exploration,” to which one participant responded, “as soon as possible when exploration has transitioned from reconnaissance to meaning.” Humans solve puzzles and find meaning in data, albeit at a higher cost than our robotic surrogates. We could debate the relative value of humans versus robots at great length without resolution but, in fact, we would be missing the point. Humans are explorers. Whether deep under the ocean, on the frigid plateaus of Antarctica, or above the atmosphere, humans are programmed to indulge our unquenchable thirst for knowledge -- not only scientific data but human experiences. We are unwilling to surrender those domains solely to robotic surrogates and forego the human experience of adventure and discovery. Balancing Science and Exploration, and Managing Expectations: NASA’s portfolio includes Earth and space science, aeronautics, and technology as well as exploration, and a healthy balance must be maintained among the sciences, and between science and exploration. The science budget should not used to compensate for the underfunding of the Vision goals and time line for exploration. Science is of enormous benefit and interest to the public and to our future generations – the inspiration derived from Hubble and Mars rovers are but two examples, the 2006 Nobel Prize in physics for work that was based on measurements from COBE is yet another. Furthermore, science programs are not just budget lines, they are people. They cannot be turned on and off without consequence. As NASA’s aging workforce reaches retirement, how are we going to attract the next generation of scientists and engineers who will continue exploring the universe? I believe we must pull rather than push; pull students into science and engineering with the promise of interesting work and a fulfilling career. What more powerful pull can there be than the opportunity to explore the universe? When budgets are redirected and the very programs that attracted young scientists are summarily terminated, they are forced to retool, retrain and reeducate themselves for other careers. They are in all likelihood lost to the NASA workforce forever and we are all poorer for it. The entire field of microgravity science was based on the expectation of a space station for long-term experimentation. Drop towers, zero-G flights and even two week flights on the Space Shuttle were just warms up for the permanent laboratory in space. Young scientists built their careers on that promise. Even as ISS grew in orbit, opportunities for its use as a world class laboratory for microgravity science were shrinking. Microgravity science, born in the 1980s, was effectively killed in 2004. As we execute the Vision for Space Exploration, it is important to be realistic about the goals, funding and timeline for science and exploration. Should we cast a net widely within the science community to find all possibilities for exploration and research that could be accomplished on the moon, and therefore glean the broadest possible support within the science communities for a lunar program? Or should we focus from the outset on science objectives that support the next step in the overall exploration strategy? Let’s not repeat the microgravity science experience on the moon. Sustained human exploration requires international collaboration. From the very beginning, human exploration has been driven by geopolitical factors, in the US as well as in the Soviet Union then and in Russia now. As we make plans to explore beyond Earth, it is appropriate that those political forces have led to cooperation rather than competition. The US is the unquestioned leader in space exploration, a position that we are unwilling relinquish. International collaborative exploration initiatives offer the United States an opportunity to maintain global leadership in a cooperative environment. Collaboration with international partners provides opportunities for countries who may be competitors in global political or economic arenas to work together to increase human knowledge and promote peaceful utilization of the solar system. The road to Mars will be a very long one, and any architecture must survive many one-year budget cycles and 4-year administrations. After several near death experiences, the ISS is still alive and will be completed because of our international commitments. The overriding importance of multi-national cooperation justifies the risk and cost of continuing the Space Shuttle program long enough to satisfy our obligations. We can debate the value of science objectives or exploration goals, but the value of international cooperation in space ventures over the past decade cannot be challenged. Inviting meaningful international participation in the exploration architecture may reduce cost, accelerate the timeline, provide additional capability, bring a measure of stability through numerous budget cycles and administrations, while engaging rivals and allies in a shared commitment to extend the boundaries of humankind into new domains. NASA has not received budget increases to support the mandates of the Vision for space Exploration and the other elements of its portfolio even in the most optimistic scenarios. Each year since 2004 when the Vision was announced, the NASA budget has fallen short of that required to achieve the mandated exploration goals and milestones. Science, aeronautics and technology have suffered severely to compensate for the shortfall. Costs associated with the shuttle retirement are not budgeted. The gap between shuttle retirement and Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV) initial operational capability is widening. In short, there is a mismatch between aspirations and appropriations that no amount of spin can disguise. Faced with inadequate budgets, the other two elements of the budget – schedule -- requirements triad must be reassessed. Again I urge that we focus on the goals of the Vision, not the schedule, and proceed in the most efficient, cost-effective and safe manner possible. The Role of Entrepreneurial Space Ventures: One of the roles of entrepreneurial space ventures should be to help NASA get out of the business of routine transportation to LEO for cargo and crews as soon as practical. Non-government entities have transported cargo to space for decades, but only NASA and the Russian Space Agency transport humans to LEO. As we have seen over the past two decades, a single transportation system for humans to space at times leaves us stuck on the ground. US flights were suspended for almost three years after Challenger, more than two years after the Columbia accident and will be suspended for some number of years after the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010. Shorter downtimes of months to one year have resulted from problems with helium leaks and external tank insulation shedding. As long as NASA is the owner, operator and sole customer of transportation services to LEO in this country, there is no competition for services and limited access to space. However, the emerging entrepreneurial space industry projects growing demand for access to space by foreign governments who want to get into the space business, from multinational corporations and from tourists. NASA is investing in commercial space transportation services through the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services project (COTS) for cargo to the ISS, and eventually crew transport as well. Bigelow Aerospace and Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services are engaged in discussions on the Atlas 5 as the launch vehicle to provide crew and cargo transportation services to a Bigelow-built space complex in the near term. As NASA refocuses on exploration, commercial ventures that will replace NASA as the sole US human space transportation system should be encouraged and incentivized by NASA and by Congress. Assurances that NASA would become a customer, not a competitor, in LEO would strengthen the business case for companies who are investing in this venture. Follow on Activities: Workshop organizers are in the process of writing a detailed summary of the presentations and discussions that led to the consensus statements. Not seeking a consensus of all workshop participants, the intention is to represent the nuances of the discussions and various points of view, and to provide recommendations for the next administration’s consideration. The Planetary Society, a co-host of the workshop, is planning a series of “town hall meetings” at several cities around the country to gain an understanding of public opinion on topics addressed at the workshop. The Society will use the results of these discussions to produce a roadmap for space exploration for the next Administration and Congress. The roadmap will cover robotic missions of exploration, human space flight, international activities, and public interests. The first of those town hall meetings was held on March 29 in Brookline, MA. Constellation as a Vehicle for Science: The second question I was asked to address concerns potential advantages of using Constellation systems for science and exploration missions. The Ares V launch vehicle, as envisioned, would offer significant increase in payload volume and payload mass at a significantly higher cost when compared with Delta and Atlas families of launch vehicles available today. In general, the advantages of launching “flagship”-class science missions on an Ares V are:
I am not aware of any reliable cost estimates for an Ares V launch, but it seems reasonable to assume that the incremental cost of a launch vehicle capable of putting 140 MT into LEO would be several times the cost of a 25 MT-capable launcher. Similarly, the cost of a science payload that requires such lift capability or would take advantage of the 860-m3 payload volume of the Ares V would be considerably more costly than “flagship” missions currently being developed for launch on EELV. If Ares V launch vehicles were available for science missions in 2025 or later, there would undoubtedly be a number of mission concepts that would enable a qualitative new approach to the important scientific questions in fields such as astronomy, astrophysics, heliophysics, Earth science, or planetary science to name a few. However, the greatly increased payload capability promised by Ares V would also result in more costly science payloads and significantly more expensive launch vehicles. One billion dollar “flagship” class mission could well be superseded by $5B to $10B “super flagship” missions. Unless the space science budget grows as the launcher capability grows, science missions that take full advantage of the capabilities of the Ares V cannot reasonably be flown on a routine basis, regardless of the availability of Constellation. In summary, it is time to go beyond LEO with humans as explorers and to focus in Mars and beyond as our goal. We will explore with multi-national partners to serve our own national and international interests, as well as to advance knowledge. With the goals clearly in focus, budgets and schedules must be balanced for the most efficient and safe exploration program. Thank you again for the opportunity to share my perspective and I am happy to answer any questions. |
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